To address the question of why we are still in Afghanistan, the directors of Learn the Facts asked five contributors to argue for a certain viewpoint to explain Canada’s participation in the ongoing war: security, diplomacy, alliances, development or ‘I don’t know.’ The following does not reflect the personal views of the author or those of Learn the Facts. Instead, it is simply meant to encourage discussion.
Diplomacy is arguably the least prominent, publicized, and popularly discussed element of Canada’s 3D (Defence, Development, and Diplomacy) strategy in Afghanistan. However, diplomacy is an important component of success in Afghanistan. This is increasingly true with the planned withdrawal of Canadian troops in 2011.
Canada brings a history of multilateralism and peace support to the diplomatic table in Afghanistan. Although the nature of the conflict being counter-insurgency, creates new challenges for Canada’s diplomatic operations. Whereas in previous conflict zones, peace support resembled more traditional diplomatic techniques such as negotiations and lobbying; counter-insurgency doctrine stresses institution and governance building, in order to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.
In order to justify Canada’s continued presence in Afghanistan, it must be proven that, not only are there benefits resulting from our contribution, but that these benefits outweigh the costs (both material, and human).
One of the three main reasons for our continued presence in Afghanistan, from a diplomatic point of view, has already been alluded to. I am referring to Canada’s assistance in the development of institutional and governance tools in order to create a democratic, prosperous and stable Afghanistan. Another key benefit of our contribution to Afghanistan in the diplomatic context is, as the 2008 Speech from the Throne termed it, “Strengthening Canada’s … Place in the World”(1). That is, giving Canada more diplomatic clout and leverage that it can then use to further its interests in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Canada’s continued presence in Afghanistan will also grant it the privilege to be a stakeholder in the future post-conflict Afghanistan. This includes creating the conditions for a possible negotiated (diplomatic) solution to the Taliban insurgency.
To conceptualize these different benefits one can arrange them along a continuum, from more altruistic (Afghani) value to more self-interested (Canadian) value. Assisting the creation of institutional and governance tools can be placed on the more altruistic end of the continuum. While, “strengthening Canada’s place in the world” is more on the self interested side. However, it is important to note that in an increasingly globalised world the conceptualized continuum shrinks. So that altruistic values can become self-interested and vice versa.
For instance, the democratic peace theory (as well as free market variants )(2) argues that democracies often have common interests, and do not go to war with each other. Using this theory, by Canada helping Afghanistan develop democratic institutions, it will gain an ally on the international stage and help contribute to world peace. Conversely, Canada’s new found clout, due to its contributions in Afghanistan, could be used to further aid Afghanistan. This is likely because Canada now has a vested interest in seeing “the Afghan project” succeed, thus intertwining the interests of the two countries.
Therefore, Canada is still in Afghanistan because there are still benefits to be gained from being in Afghanistan. These benefits, regardless of how altruistic or self-interested they may seem, are invariably in both nation’s interests. I believe these diplomatic benefits coupled with the benefits from the security, and development spheres, make a compelling argument for why Canada is still in Afghanistan.
Notes:
(1) Government of Canada, “the Speech from the Throne Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session of the 39th Parliament of Canada”, October 16, 2007, http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=sft-ddt/2007-eng.htm
(2) For a popularized version of the free market variant see “The Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention” in Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York : Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999)
